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THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, EXPERIENCE RATING, AND 
THE PROBLEM OF NON-VACCINATION 
Eric Esshaki* 
 
Polio, the whooping cough, and the mumps, among many other 
communicable diseases, were once prevalent in communities within the 
developed world and killed millions of people.1 The advent of 
vaccinations contained or eradicated several of these diseases.2 
However, these diseases still exist in the environment3 and are making a 
comeback in the United States.4 Their persistence is directly attributable 
to the rising trend among parents refusing to vaccinate their children.5 
One proposed solution to this problem is to hold parents liable in tort 
when others are harmed by their failure to vaccinate. Another proposed 
solution argues that parents should pay a tax when they fail to vaccinate 
their children. Although these proposals might have some limited 
benefits, there is a third and more efficacious solution: Congress should 
amend the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to permit insurance companies to 
discriminately charge higher premiums to those who choose to not 
vaccinate. Part I lays out the problem of non-vaccination in more detail. 
Part II explains the shortcomings of tort liability and taxation as viable 
solutions to the problem. Part III describes the benefits of permitting 
insurance companies to charge higher premiums for non-vaccination and 
explains why Congress must amend the ACA before higher premiums 
can be charged. 
PART I. THE DECLINE OF HERD IMMUNITY AND THE RISING COSTS OF 
NON-VACCINATION 
There is a rising trend among parents in the United States to forgo 
vaccinating their children against preventable communicable diseases.6 
                                                      
*     J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School. 
 1.  Brian Krans, Anti-Vacination Movement Causes a Deadly Year in the U.S., HEALTHLINE 
(Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.healthline.com/health-news/children-anti-vaccination-movement-leads-
to-disease-outbreaks-120312. 
 2.  See generally Disease Eradication, HISTORY OF VACCINES.ORG (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/disease-eradication (discussing the eradication of 
small pox and the potential to eradicate other communicable diseases with widespread vaccination). 
 3.  See id. 
 4.  CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, REPORTED CASES AND DEATHS FROM VACCINE 
PREVENTABLE DISEASES, UNITED STATES, 1950-2013 (2015), 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/downloads/appendices/E/reported-cases.pdf. 
 5.  See Krans, supra note 1.  
 6.  Christine Parkins, Protecting the Herd: A Public Health, Economics, and Legal Argument 
for Taxing Parents Who Opt-Out of Mandatory Childhood Vaccinations, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
437, 440 (2012). 
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This trend is dangerous and has the potential to create a public health 
emergency.7 Parents who refuse to vaccinate their children do not just 
threaten their children’s health and their community’s health; they also 
contribute to substantial economic costs.8 The United States spends ten 
billion dollars each year to treat vaccine-preventable diseases.9 If the 
trend against vaccination continues to increase and more people are 
infected with vaccine-preventable diseases, increased healthcare 
expenditures will inevitably follow. Although the economic impact is 
substantial, the impact on human life is even more alarming. Current 
figures suggest that approximately 30,000 people lose their lives each 
year as a result of vaccine-preventable diseases.10 Again, if the trend 
towards non-vaccination continues, the number of lives affected and 
potentially lost by these diseases will also likely increase.11 
Although the current figures (i.e., ten billion dollars and 30,000 lives 
per year) reflecting the negative impact of forgoing childhood 
vaccinations are not necessarily alarming relative to overall healthcare 
costs and overall deaths, bare statistics fail to tell the whole story. The 
thrust of the problem lies not in the current figures, but in the real 
possibility of these figures increasing substantially, or even 
exponentially, if the non-vaccination trend continues. One might argue 
that an individual’s choice to forgo vaccinating her children does not 
affect the general public because the general public can vaccinate. This 
solution would offer protection from those who choose not to be 
vaccinated.12 This argument suggests that unvaccinated, infected 
individuals cannot infect a vaccinated individual. If that were the case, 
then the problem would be limited to individuals who choose to forgo 
vaccinating. This sort of analysis, however, ignores the complexity of 
the problem and fails to recognize that even when a small portion of the 
population chooses to forgo vaccinating, there is substantial cause for 
concern; vaccine-preventable diseases will proliferate in the community 
and affect those who do not medically qualify to receive the vaccines. 
To better appreciate the gravity of the problem, and the harm it poses to 
the general public, it is necessary to understand how vaccinating protects 
those who are ineligible to become vaccinated. 
                                                      
 7.  See id. 
 8.  Id. at 440. 
 9.  Id. at 440–41. 
 10.  Id. at 441. 
 11.  The figures cited do not take into account the large number of people who will likely 
suffer debilitating effects from vaccine-preventable diseases such as polio. These diseases will also 
create economic costs if the current trend towards non-vaccination continues. 
 12.  This assumption is incorrect because it takes for granted that vaccination is a matter of 
choice; sometimes, for medical reasons or age, vaccination is not possible. See infra note 16 
(providing examples of individuals that are not able to become vaccinated due to medical 
conditions). 
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This understanding starts with the concept of “herd immunity.”13 
The scientific literature defines herd immunity as “the principle that if a 
significant portion of the community—for most diseases, more than 80 
percent—is vaccinated, those who cannot be vaccinated will be 
protected from illness by the community members who are vaccinated 
because the vaccine has eliminated ‘chains of contagion.’”14 That is, 
when “the proportion of nonsusceptible [sic] individuals increases to an 
extent that the infectious agent is significantly limited in its ability to 
spread among the remaining susceptible individuals, outbreaks are 
aborted, and pandemics abate.”15 Herd immunity is important because 
there is a substantial portion of the population that cannot be vaccinated 
and depends entirely on herd immunity for protection.16 When too many 
individuals fail to vaccinate and instead rely on herd immunity for their 
own protection against disease, it becomes difficult to manage outbreaks 
and epidemics. Hence, when herd immunity diminishes, some of the 
more vulnerable in our society (e.g., those who cannot safely be 
vaccinated) are needlessly subjected to preventable communicable 
diseases.17 
The correlation between the number of vaccinated individuals and 
the effectiveness of herd immunity varies among diseases.18 For 
example, to achieve herd immunity against polio, about eighty percent of 
the community needs to be vaccinated.19 The number is closer to ninety 
percent to achieve the same for measles.20 If the number of unvaccinated 
individuals were spread evenly across all geographical demographics, 
the trend towards non-vaccination would not necessarily pose an 
immediate concern; the real concern arises when herd immunity is 
diminished. For example, if five percent of the entire population is not 
vaccinated against measles, and the threshold to preserve herd immunity 
requires only ninety percent of the population to be vaccinated, then 
                                                      
 13.  See generally Matan J. Cohen et al., Vaccination, Herd Behavior, and Herd Immunity, 33 
MED. DECIS. MAKING 1026 (2013).   
 14.  Parkins, supra note 6, at 440 (citing Donald S. Kenkel, Prevention, in 1B Handbook of 
Health Economics 1677, 1694 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000)). 
 15.  Cohen, supra note 13, at 1032. 
 16.  See Who Should NOT Get Vaccinated with These Vaccines?, CDC.GOV, (Nov. 5, 2015), 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd-vac/should-not-vacc.htm (indicating that some vaccines are not 
available to nursing mothers, people with pre-existing health conditions, and newborns, among 
others). 
 17.  There are several normative arguments one might make regarding why a healthy 
individual ought to be vaccinated to protect others who cannot become vaccinated. Although 
interesting, such arguments are outside the scope of this Comment. I will not address those 
arguments here. 
 18.  See, e.g., Alan R. Hinman et al., Childhood Immunization: Laws That Work, 30 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 122, 125 (2002) (discussing the percentage of the population required to be vaccinated 
against measles in order to achieve effective herd immunity). 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id.  
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perhaps the five percent of unvaccinated individuals would have no 
impact on the maintenance of herd immunity. 
This calculus changes, however, when we see trends in certain 
locations where far more than ten percent of the population is 
unvaccinated, thus threatening herd immunity within that geographical 
location. So even though the total population of unvaccinated individuals 
remains at five percent, we see herd immunity diminish within those 
geographical areas trending against vaccinating. In the United States, 
many regions of the country already fall well below the thresholds 
necessary to maintain herd immunity.21 These unvaccinated “pockets” 
across the country are caused by the religious and philosophical beliefs 
embedded in the particular communities where a substantial number of 
parents (more than the threshold requirement to maintain herd immunity 
within the community) choose to not vaccinate.22 Whatever the cause, 
the high non-vaccination rates in these communities pose serious 
challenges and cause serious harm.23 
PART II. THE FAILURE OF TORT LIABILITY AND TAXATION 
A. The Failure of Tort Liability as a Solution to Non-Vaccination 
Although non-vaccination has diminished herd immunity—posing a 
serious threat to many individuals in the United States—attempts to 
mitigate the harmful effects of non-vaccination through tort liability 
have been ill received and largely unsuccessful, as evidenced by the 
continued failure to vaccinate.24 Parents provide several justifications for 
not vaccinating their children, but whatever the reason, one thing is 
clear: many parents do not want the government intruding upon the 
medical choices that they make for their children.25 
The current legal scholarship addressing the problem of non-
vaccination among children has focused on remedies that avoid any 
direct assault on individual autonomy.26 That is, recently proposed 
                                                      
 21.  See id.  
 22.  Id. at 125. 
 23.  See id. (highlighting the prevalence of recent outbreaks of vaccine-preventable illnesses 
such as polio, pertussis, and rubella).  
 24.  See, e.g., Kyra R. Wagoner, Mandating the Gardasil Vaccine: A Constitutional Analysis, 
5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 403, 405 (2008) (discussing the various challenges raised to mandatory 
vaccination programs implemented by school districts as a requirement for children to attend 
school). 
 25.  See id. (indicating that one of the challenges raised against mandatory vaccination 
programs was a “governmental interference with individual autonomy”). 
 26.  See Parkins, supra note 6, at 471 (suggesting a personal tax on individuals who fail to 
vaccinate their children); see also Douglas S. Diekema, Choices Should Have Consequences: 
Failure to Vaccinate, Harm to Others, and Civil Liability, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
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solutions have shifted away from government-mandated and compulsory 
vaccinations. Two prominent proposals are currently being offered to 
rectify the problem while avoiding challenges based on the concept of 
individual autonomy: (1) taxing parents who refuse to vaccinate their 
children;27 and (2) holding parents liable in tort when others are harmed 
because parents failed to vaccinate.28 Both of these proposed solutions, 
however, fall short of successfully solving the problem and provoke 
controversy. 
Proponents of expanding tort liability to cover parents who choose 
not to vaccinate their children argue that parents “act unfairly to others 
in the community by pursuing self-interest ahead of civic responsibility. 
Even if the community refuses to coerce or punish these free riders, they 
remain morally culpable in an important way.”29 They further argue that 
parents’ failure to take reasonable steps constitutes a breach of duty.30 So 
far, these claims follow the standard analytical framework of traditional 
negligence in tort liability and seem unproblematic.31 There are, 
however, three primary shortcomings not addressed by this solution: (1) 
the causation element is difficult to prove in this context, which might 
make tort liability an unfeasible solution; (2) such a solution is limited in 
its effectual capabilities to prevent and reconcile harm; and (3) it 
incentivizes free-riding on herd immunity as a primary source of 
protection against communicable diseases. At no cost of their own, free-
riders will gain the benefits of the costs and risks incurred by those who 
choose to be vaccinated. 
Taking each of the above concerns in turn, I will first discuss the 
causation issue.32 Any theory of negligence in tort law requires the 
victim to prove, inter alia, that his harm was both factually and legally 
caused by the negligent actions of another.33 The primary difficulty 
plaintiffs will face in pursing a theory of tort liability against parents 
when they fail to vaccinate their children is establishing factual 
causation or the “but-for cause.”34 To do this, the plaintiff must prove 
that but for the defendant’s failure to vaccinate his child, he (the 
                                                      
90, 93–94 (2009) (arguing that parents who refuse to vaccinate their children should be liable in tort 
for any harm caused to another individual as a result of this decision). 
 27.  E.g., Parkins, supra note 6, at 471. 
 28.  E.g., Diekema, supra note 26. 
 29.  Id. at 92–93.  
 30.  Id. at 93. 
 31.  See David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1671–
72 (2007) (listing the traditional five elements of negligence: duty, breach of duty, cause in fact, 
proximate cause, and harm). 
 32.  I assume, arguendo, that the elements of duty and breach of duty are established as a 
matter of law, and I will discuss what I consider to be the more difficult question: proving causation. 
 33.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 34.  Hale v. Ostrow, 166 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Tenn. 2005) (stating that factual causation exists 
when “[t]he plaintiff’s injury would not have happened but for the defendant’s [act].” (emphasis 
added)). 
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plaintiff) would not have been harmed; this is no easy task given the 
nature of the communicable diseases and their spread among 
individuals.35 “Although technological advances have made tracking the 
spread of disease more reliable than ever, it is still difficult to trace 
contagions through both place and time.”36 A plaintiff might be able to 
demonstrate that he had exposure to person A, that person A had a 
communicable disease, and that he now has the same communicable 
disease, but this is insufficient to establish factual causation. Given the 
social nature of our communities and the multiple contacts that we have 
with others on a daily basis (many of whom we do not know), there 
seems to be no way to firmly establish that person A is the responsible 
party and the other contacts, often unknown to the plaintiff, were not the 
responsible parties. Moreover, the ability to track the party responsible 
for the transmission of the disease is further complicated in those 
communities with a substantial number of unvaccinated individuals.37 In 
such a situation, it is entirely possible that more than one individual 
could be causally responsible. This raises the question as to how liability 
would be imposed when causation is potentially linked to more than one 
individual, but there is a lack of definitive proof.38 
Supposing for a moment that proving causation is not at issue here, 
it is worth considering whether tort liability would provide a satisfactory 
remedy. The primary purpose of tort liability is to “provide 
compensation to injured persons.”39 It functions remedially and ex post. 
Hence, one might wonder if tort liability is conducive to the goal of 
ensuring herd immunity in our communities, where herd immunity seeks 
to prevent (as opposed to remedy) communicable disease. This 
Comment argues that it does not. Although holding parents liable in tort 
might provide a deterrent against forgoing vaccinations, whatever 
ostensible deterrent there might be is sure to be an overstatement; where 
herd immunity exists, the likelihood of spreading communicable 
diseases is limited. And if there is a limited risk of spreading 
communicable diseases (or getting one in the first place), there is also a 
limited risk of being held liable in tort. Thus, tort liability is unlikely to 
prompt parents to vaccinate their children and will only create an 
effective incentive after herd immunity has already declined within the 
community. At this point, when herd immunity is diminished and no 
longer effective, so too will be the value of incentivizing vaccinations 
                                                      
 35.  See generally A Shot in the Dark: Why Parents Should Not be Held Civilly Liable for 
Injuries Caused by Unvaccinated Children, NAT’L L. REV. (2014), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/shot-dark-why-parents-should-not-be-held-civilly-liable-
injuries-caused-unvaccinated. 
 36.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  See id.  
 39.  E.g., 14 N.Y. PRAC., NEW YORK LAW OF TORTS § 8:2. 
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via tort liability, because the absence of heard immunity will be realized 
and the damage done. 
Holding parents liable in tort when they fail to vaccinate their 
children creates an additional concern: free-riding.40 If we assume that 
tort liability preserves herd immunity by creating the necessary 
incentives to encourage enough individuals to vaccinate, there will still 
be those who free-ride on the backs of those contributing to the 
maintenance of herd immunity.41 These “free-riders” will essentially 
benefit from the costs and risks incurred by those who choose to 
vaccinate and will, themselves, contribute nothing. From a normative 
perspective, there is something intuitively unfair and irresponsible about 
this scenario. Tort liability inevitably creates this free-rider concern but 
remains entirely powerless to address it in a substantive way. 
B. Why Taxation Fails to Address Non-Vaccination 
Legal scholars also suggest that a tax ought to be imposed on parents 
who do not vaccinate their children.42 The idea is essentially borrowed 
from the ACA.43 Like the ACA’s individual mandate to purchase health 
insurance, these proposals would impose a mandate to vaccinate or face 
an IRS penalty.44 This solution, however, also has its shortcomings. The 
implementation of a vaccination mandate will almost certainly foster 
polarizing political controversy and prove to be politically impossible to 
implement.45 In addition, such a mandate would likely invite 
constitutional questions related to the scope and extent of individual 
autonomy in child rearing.46 
The ACA’s individual mandate provision was accompanied by no 
shortage of political controversy and acrimonious debate.47 Those in 
opposition to the mandate contested the government’s legal authority to 
force them to participate in the health insurance market. Although there 
                                                      
 40.  Parkins, supra note 6, at 441. 
 41.  See id. 
 42.  See generally Parkins, supra note 6. 
 43.  Id. at 472–73. 
 44.  See id. at 471–78. 
 45.  Cf. 51% Remain Opposed to Obamacare’s Individual Mandate, RASMUSSEN REPORTS 
(July 7, 2014), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/archive/health_care_update_ 
archive/july_2014/51_remain_opposed_to_obamacare_s_individual_mandate (discussing the 
extensive controversy surrounding the passage of the ACA and, in particular, the individual 
mandate to purchase insurance against the threat of the imposition of a tax). Although the individual 
mandate provision of the ACA ultimately became law, the issue here concerns a fundamental right 
valued greater than the ability to opt out of health insurance. See infra notes 48–50 and 
accompanying text. 
 46.  See generally Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(plaintiff argued that requiring her child to be vaccinated in order to be admitted to a school violated 
her constitutional rights). 
 47.  See RASMUSSEN REPORTS, supra note 45. 
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is room to argue, the thrust of this argument focused primarily on 
individual economic rights.48 Unlike the ACA’s individual mandate to 
purchase insurance, a government mandate to vaccinate children has and 
will continue to foster concerns regarding the usurpation of fundamental 
rights—rights regarding a parent’s ability to decide the best way to raise 
a child.49 This sort of argument, though not necessarily constitutional in 
nature, could potentially halt the political process, thus making the 
possibility of implementing a vaccine mandate nearly impossible. 
If there were political support for a vaccine mandate, it is not clear 
whether a vaccine mandate would be constitutional. After the 
implementation of the ACA’s mandate, however, it is much more likely. 
The justification for the ACA’s mandate lies in the ability of the 
government to compel economic decisions. But when a government 
mandate implicates a fundamental right such as rearing one’s children,50 
it is a different proposition altogether. To coerce a desired behavior by 
threatening a tax is functionally identical to coercing the behavior via 
force. For example, no one would argue that taxing speech is 
constitutional under the Spending Clause. First, free speech is a core 
fundamental right.51 Second, a tax on free speech would curtail or 
severely limit that right.52 Similarly, taxing one’s ability to rear his 
children in a manner consistent with his personal beliefs constitutes a 
violation of his core fundamental right.53 To coerce a particular course of 
action through the threat of a tax appears to, at the very least, infringe on 
that right and raise constitutional questions. 
PART III. AMENDING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
Tort liability and the imposition of a tax fall short of rectifying the 
problems that arise when parents refuse to vaccinate their children.54 
Where tort liability fails to address the problem adequately, imposing a 
tax invites political criticism and poses potential constitutional concerns. 
But where legal solutions or mandates fail to provide the right balance 
between creating the necessary incentives for healthy living and 
                                                      
 48.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). 
 49.  See e.g., Workman, 419 F. App’x at 355–56. 
 50.  E.g., P.O.P.S. v. Gardner, 998 F.2d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he rights to . . . have 
children, and maintain a relationship with one’s children are fundamental rights protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. . . . Statutes that directly and substantially impair 
those rights require strict scrutiny.”). 
 51.  E.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936). 
 52.  Cf. e.g., id. In Grosjean, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana 
statute, which imposed a tax on the circulation of newspapers. The Court stated, “[a] free press 
stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be 
fettered [via taxation] is to fetter ourselves.” Id. 
 53.  See supra note 50. 
 54.  See supra Part II. 
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individual autonomy, the free market has the potential to offer an 
effective and satisfactory solution. This goal can be accomplished by 
allowing insurance providers to manipulate health insurance premiums 
in a manner that requires non-vaccinated individuals to pay higher 
premiums. 
At present, the ACA substantially limits the discretion of insurance 
companies to discriminately charge higher premiums.55 More 
specifically, the ACA only permits insurance companies to charge 
discriminatory premiums for the following reasons: tobacco use, age, 
family coverage, and geography.56 Permitting discriminatory premiums 
based on these factors makes sense; that is, the presence of the factors is 
commensurate to the risk incurred by the insurance company. Glaringly 
missing from the list of exceptions provided by the ACA is an 
individual’s vaccination status.57 Hence, to permit the free market to 
adequately address the problems related to non-vaccination without 
treading on individual autonomy, the ACA should be amended to permit 
insurance companies to charge discriminatory rates based on an 
individual’s vaccination status. Of course, an exception would be 
necessary where an individual is precluded from vaccination for medical 
reasons. 
As previously noted, it makes sense to permit insurance companies 
to charge higher premiums where the risk they incur in insuring an 
individual is substantially higher. The difficulty is in determining which 
factors substantially increase that risk. It is obvious that the permissible 
factors enumerated in the ACA substantially increase the risk. What is 
not obvious is why other factors such as an individual’s vaccination 
status are omitted. The United States is already spending ten billion 
dollars each year treating vaccine-preventable communicable diseases, 
and this number will rise if the trends against vaccination continue.58 
Admittedly, the costs of treating preventable communicable diseases are 
far less than the costs to treat, for example, tobacco-related diseases.59 
However, if the purpose of the ACA’s tobacco exception is to obviate 
the increased risk associated with insuring tobacco users, there is no 
obvious reason why insurance companies should be prohibited from 
doing the same when it comes to insuring unvaccinated individuals.60 
                                                      
 55.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(i-iv) (2010). 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  See id.  
 58.  See supra Part I. 
 59.  See Health Effects, AM. LUNG ASS’N, http://www.lung.org/stop-smoking/about-
smoking/health-effects/smoking.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2015) (indicating that 96 billion dollars 
were spent in 2004 treating health illness related to cigarette smoking). 
 60.  Perhaps it is necessary to tailor the discriminatory premium charged with the risk level 
incurred, but there is seemingly no reason to ignore the risk entirely. The ACA currently permits 
flexibility in discriminatory premium charges by recognizing the varying levels of risk associated 
with each factor listed. For example, according to the ACA, tobacco users can be charged premiums 
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The factors enumerated in the ACA are factors that merely increase 
the risk associated with insuring the individual. These factors do not 
pose risks to third parties. Failing to vaccinate, however, creates a 
substantial risk of harm to third parties, thus increasing the level of risk 
associated with insuring not only the unvaccinated individuals, but also 
the vulnerable third parties. In other words, a person’s age might very 
well contribute to the overall risk associated with providing that person 
with insurance. However, that risk is limited and unlikely to have an 
effect on the risk evaluation for insuring third parties. The same cannot 
be said of unvaccinated individuals. Unvaccinated individuals not only 
increase the risk incurred by the insurance company for their own 
insurance, but they also increase the risk level associated with insuring 
other customers who can no longer depend on herd immunity for 
protection and who are more frequently exposed to communicable 
diseases.61 
When determining what factors ought to permit charging 
discriminatory premiums, we might look beyond the costs associated 
with treating individuals possessing a particular factor and also focus on 
whether the presence of those factors leads to an increase in third-party 
risk. Vaccination status would be one of a limited number of factors that 
would have this exception-qualifying effect and, therefore, vaccination 
status should be one of the exceptions in the ACA, ultimately permitting 
insurance companies to charge higher premiums. 
Charging higher insurance premiums based on an individual’s 
vaccination status would provide the same incentive that a tax would 
achieve.62 Functionally, there is no difference. It would not, however, 
raise individual autonomy issues or constitutional issues, because the 
underlying reasoning would be based on economic considerations and 
would seek to match the risk level with the premium charge imposed. 
Where normative considerations are often the primary concern regarding 
the implementation of a tax, economic considerations (though 
functionally achieving the same results) supply the purpose for 
permitting higher premiums for unvaccinated individuals. Moreover, 
charging higher premiums avoids the intricate causal issues and free-
rider concerns associated with the application of tort liability.63 
                                                      
at a rate of 1.5 to 1 compared to non-tobacco users. And the elderly can be charged higher premium 
rates at a rate of 3 to 1 compared to other adults. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(ii-iii). 
 61.  See generally Krans, supra note 1. 
 62.  From the consumer’s perspective, the incentive provided by implementing a tax is 
functionally no different from paying increased premiums. In both scenarios, consumers are charged 
more because they are not vaccinated, thus providing incentive for them to become vaccinated. 
 63.  See supra Part II. 
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CONCLUSION 
The current trends against vaccinating children have contributed to 
the resurgence of vaccine-preventable communicable diseases in the 
United States. As this trend continues to increase, herd immunity will 
continue to decrease, and the costs associated with these diseases—both 
human and economic—will continue to grow. Although there are current 
proposals in the literature, such as the imposition of tort liability and 
implementation of a tax for failure to vaccinate, these proposals will 
likely fall short of solving the problem. Tort liability would only serve as 
an ex post remedy and would also contribute to the free-rider problem 
discussed above. Taxation raises serious political concerns and potential 
constitutional issues. Where these proposals fall short, amending Section 
300gg(a)(1)(A) of the ACA to permit discriminatory premium charges 
for those who fail to vaccinate provides an effectual and politically 
viable solution while avoiding the concerns raised by using tort liability 
or taxation as the solution. 
 
